Unpublished
Edward R. Morey
2017
2017
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Cite
APA
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Morey, E. R. (2017). ♫ If you want to be happy for the rest of your life, like what you want, and want what you will like .
Chicago/Turabian
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Morey, Edward R. “♫ If You Want to Be Happy for the Rest of Your Life, like What You Want, and Want What You Will like ,” 2017.
MLA
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Morey, Edward R. ♫ If You Want to Be Happy for the Rest of Your Life, like What You Want, and Want What You Will like . 2017.
BibTeX Click to copy
@unpublished{edward2017a,
title = {♫ If you want to be happy for the rest of your life, like what you want, and want what you will like },
year = {2017},
author = {Morey, Edward R.}
}
This material has been incorporated into my book
Abstract: The subject is wants vs. likes (wanting/desiring vs. liking what you experience). Economic choice theory assumes you have a ranking of bundles based on preference (higher-ranked bundles are preferred in that if two bundles are feasible, you choose the higher-ranked of the two). The question is whether this ranking is based on betterment/well-being or based on wants/desires. Two neurological theories of choice are outlined, along with their supporting, and conflicting, neurological evidence: the error-prediction hypothesis and the incentive-salience hypothesis. Both assume, and the evidence supports, that your ranking is based on wants/desires,
not, at the point of choice, on which feasible bundle will increase your WB the most. Both address the issue of whether you will only want what you will like (want the most that which will increase your emotional WB the most) and whether you want everything that you will like. With the error-prediction hypothesis, wants are predominately a function of expected emotional-WB. With incentive-salience, this link is easily broken if you are in an enhanced physiological state (hungry, tired, curious, aroused, etc.) and, before you choose, a cue (signal) for one of the alternatives appears, making that alternative more salient, so you choose it even though you would have liked more the experience of one of the other alternatives. The implications for modeling choices, the pursuit of happiness, and ethics are discussed.
not, at the point of choice, on which feasible bundle will increase your WB the most. Both address the issue of whether you will only want what you will like (want the most that which will increase your emotional WB the most) and whether you want everything that you will like. With the error-prediction hypothesis, wants are predominately a function of expected emotional-WB. With incentive-salience, this link is easily broken if you are in an enhanced physiological state (hungry, tired, curious, aroused, etc.) and, before you choose, a cue (signal) for one of the alternatives appears, making that alternative more salient, so you choose it even though you would have liked more the experience of one of the other alternatives. The implications for modeling choices, the pursuit of happiness, and ethics are discussed.
